This Day in History
On 8 August 1967, a document consisting of just five articles was signed by the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, along with the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, in Bangkok. It was upon this document, known as the Bangkok Declaration, that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) was founded. It officially established regional cooperation between the smaller and middle powers of Southeast Asia so that they could survive the turbulent postcolonial era. After signing the Declaration, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia Tun Abdul Razak stressed the importance of creating “a deep awareness that [Southeast Asian nations] cannot survive for long as independent but isolated peoples unless we also think and act together and unless we demonstrate through our deeds that we belong to a family of Southeast Asian nations…”
At that point, Southeast Asia was “a volatile dividing line” in the international conflict between the US and the USSR, as well as between China and the USSR. The bipolar divisions between communism and capitalism were most apparent from the proxy contest in Vietnam. There was also the threat of communist expansion: the impending victory of North Vietnam and China’s Great Cultural Revolution were feared to cause a domino effect, potentially resulting in the entire region falling to communism. ASEAN states were already battling communist insurgencies which had the potential to invite external intervention. To top it off, interstate tensions ranging from territorial disputes, ethnic conflicts and power imbalances between smaller and larger states threatened to further destabilise the region.
It was hoped that the ASEAN states could cooperate to tackle these internal and external challenges to maintain regional stability. Adam Malik commented that ASEAN showed the political will of nations to “take charge of their own future” and to prevent it from remaining “the arena and the subject of major power rivalry and then conflict”.
However, ASEAN’s approach to regional cooperation would differ markedly from other international organisations. In terms of security, ASEAN states did not go so far as other Cold War alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) to establish an alliance, despite their shared security concerns. Far from making security their explicit objective, there were only “limited and open ended” references to regional peace and stability in the Bangkok Declaration. Instead, its aspirations were mainly couched in terms of softer issues like social, cultural, and economic development and cooperation. ASEAN leaders even took pains to stress that the organisation was not a security alliance.
The framers of the Bangkok Declaration were cautious because of their conflicting perceptions of regional security, as reflected in the proposal for the Southeast Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SEAARC). Indonesia wished to introduce clauses which restricted ASEAN states’ ability to form security arrangements with big powers. However, its proposal was rejected by the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand—all of whom had security relationships with foreign powers which they did not wish to alienate.
ASEAN had also wished to avoid the polarising perception of the organisation as a security bloc, which would imply an identifiable threat they were fighting against. ASEAN’s predecessors—the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO)—had both failed in this regard. Their openly anti-communist stance had alienated nonaligned states such as Indonesia. Indonesia was the largest and potentially most significant state in the region, and without its participation, Southeast Asian nations were unlikely to achieve much in terms of regional cooperation. Thus, for the organisation to remain inclusive ASEAN had to water down its security aspirations.
The Bangkok Declaration was not only humble in its aspirations but also its level of institutionalisation. ASEAN’s structure was much looser than other regional organisations like the European Union (EU) which has a supranational political structure. EU member states relinquish a degree of their sovereignty to the EU decision-making institutions, thus allowing them to bind member states regardless of whether they agree.
The Bangkok Declaration had much more limited machinery and only provided for the annual meetings of foreign ministers. It did not even provide for the meeting of the heads of government, who did not meet for a further ten years after the signing of the Declaration. Instead of binding legal obligations, the Declaration focuses on mutual assistance and cooperation between states.
There are two closely related reasons for such limited institutionalisation. First, a primary rationale for ASEAN was to strengthen the sovereign capacities of member states. In the wake of decolonisation, states were facing regime instability due to insurgents and secessionist groups. ASEAN was formed to allow governments to focus on their internal security issues and to consolidate power without fear of external interference. It would thus be counter-intuitive for ASEAN states to limit their sovereign authority by surrendering it to a superior institution.
The newly independent states also attached a particular importance to state sovereignty due to their colonial past. Colonialism, an extreme form of interference, had contributed to Southeast Asian nations perceiving the international system as “predatory”, where larger powers are exploitative of smaller powers. This resulted in Southeast Asian nations being sensitive to issues of non-intervention. Member states wished to be left alone to deal their internal challenges without any interference from their neighbours.
This attitude is enshrined in the principle of non-interference. The Bangkok Declaration first implies it in the phrase “stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities”. Later, the principle of non-interference was formally recognised in Article 2 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) 1976.
Non-interference and a strong respect for state sovereignty are norms that continue to underpin ASEAN’s unique approach to regionalism, known as the ASEAN way. Under this approach. ASEAN will not operate as a superior institution forcing member states into legally binding agreements. Instead, it will be a non-threatening forum for regional leaders to consult each other informally in settings like golf courses and in corridors between meetings.
Perhaps ASEAN has been effective all these years because of what it is not, rather than what it is. It is inclusive because it is not an overtly anti-communist alliance; it is conducive because of the lack of institutional structures with binding power; it is viable because it is not overly ambitious in what it sets out to do.
Its seemingly modest success becomes salient when one compares it to its predecessors—SEATO and ASA—which at most had three Southeast Asian member states at any point in time. Today, ASEAN comprises all 11 countries in Southeast Asia.
Given the heterogeneity of the region, historical inter-state tensions, and the volatility of the postcolonial era, ASEAN has achieved a degree of coherence which should not be understated. Whilst the Bangkok Declaration was mostly aspirational and loosely worded, it has brought together divergent states to tackle shared problems, where they had failed to do so on a bilateral basis. It is this soft, cautious regionalism which strikes a precarious balance between state sovereignty and regional cooperation that has allowed for the success and survival of ASEAN to this day.
About the author
Rachel Ho Yixin is a student at the National University of Singapore.
Image credit
Peter Paul Perez Blanco on ASEAN website
